Rotagraphy Forms

itsrobenia's poetic form cartography

excerpt from “Rotagraphy Forms” in Metanoia, itsrobenia’s collection of essays

Section 1: Parmenides and the Forms

In the dialogue Parmenides, the encounter between the elder Parmenides and a young Socrates functions as a trial of metaphysical seriousness. Plato presents Parmenides as a philosopher concerned with the structural integrity of thought. His engagement with Socrates centers on the implications of positing Forms as “beings themselves by themselves.” Parmenides’ challenge centers on the instability that arises once Forms are posited as “things themselves,” as beings that exist independently and universally. He warns that such a move invites objections so persistent that most abandon the theory entirely:

“And yet, Socrates,” said Parmenides, “the forms inevitably involve these objections and a host of others besides – if there are those characters for things, and a person is to mark off each form as ‘something itself.’ As a result, whoever hears about them is doubtful and objects that they do not exist, and that, even if they do, they must by strict necessity be unknowable to human nature; and in saying this he seems to have a point; and, as we said, he is extraordinarily hard to win over. Only a very gifted man can come to know that for each thing there is some kind, a being itself by itself; but only a prodigy more remarkable still will discover that and be able to teach someone else who has sifted all these difficulties thoroughly and critically for himself.”¹

This passage establishes the Forms as entities requiring sustained philosophical labor. To “mark off each form as something itself” is to claim that for any thing we speak meaningfully, there is a stable intelligible structure not reducible to its examples. That stability provokes resistance: if the Form is itself by itself, then it exceeds human convenience. It cannot be adjusted to preference, majority agreement, or rhetorical need. The thinker must develop the capacity to reason beyond appearances while remaining accountable to logical coherence. Parmenides suggests a fracture between being and knowing. The Forms require a mind trained to endure contradiction without collapsing into skepticism (”they do not exist”) or mysticism (”they exist but are unknowable”). Metaphysical claims are only as strong as the mind’s capacity to survive their consequences.

This Platonic concern with form as intelligible structure—demanding discipline, resisting convenience, requiring sustained engagement—proves foundational to understanding poetic form not as decoration, but as a method of philosophical practice. Parmenides turns to becoming. Here, he isolates a problem of temporal relation that destabilizes linear understanding. He acknowledges that the Forms are defensible, but only by those willing to endure prolonged inquiry and self-critique. This emphasis on discipline anticipates the methodological exercises that follow in the dialogue, where hypotheses are examined and reversed to test their consistency. A thing does not simply become older or younger relative to another over time; rather, difference itself must already be present as a condition for any becoming to occur:

Therefore, that which comes to be older than itself comes to be, at the same time, younger than itself, if in fact it is to have something it comes to be older than.”—”What do you mean?”—”I mean this: there is no need for a thing to come to be different from a thing that is already different; it must, rather, already be different from what is already different, have come to be different from what has come to be different, and be going to be different from what is going to be different; but it must not have come to be, be going to be, or be different from what comes to be different: it must come to be different, and nothing else.²

If something becomes older than itself, it must simultaneously become younger than itself—not sequentially, but structurally. This means difference cannot arise after identity is established; difference must be foundational. Time, then, is not the container in which change happens, but the name we give to difference already at work. If Forms are what make intelligibility possible, then they must exist prior to, and independent of, the temporal processes that appear to generate meaning. Parmenides demands a reorientation of philosophical labor. The young Socrates falters when Parmenides questions how Forms relate to their particulars—does the Form of largeness itself participate in largeness? If many things share in one Form, is the Form divided or whole? At these structural test, Socrates falters because he has not yet learned to hold contradiction without premature resolution. The Forms require a mode of thought capable of holding simultaneity, contradiction, and abstraction without resolving them prematurely.

This conception of Forms introduces a fundamental tension. If Forms are eternal and intelligible only through rigorous philosophical maturation, then the soul’s relation to them cannot be instantaneous. Knowledge becomes an ongoing orientation toward structures that exceed any single moment of comprehension. The relevance of this framework extends beyond ancient metaphysics. The commitment to Forms introduces a way of thinking in which meaning is produced by alignment with underlying structure. What matters is not how often something appears, but how it participates in what is stable. This orientation toward structure over surface establishes the foundation for what follows: an exploration of poetic form not as aesthetic ornament, but as a discipline capable of stabilizing experience within intelligible structure. If Parmenides demonstrates that Forms require sustained philosophical labor, then the question becomes: what happens when that labor is enacted through poetry?

1. Plato, Parmenides, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper, trans. Mary Louise Gill and Paul Ryan (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997), 436.

2. Plato, Parmenides, 442.